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Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial
Profiling: How the White Male Dominant Power
Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen
Through the Creation of Black as Criminal
Steven R. Morrison ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Postmodern investigations of racism in American law follow in the tradition of
tragic detective films noir: pursuing the culprit through a maze of smoke and mirrors in
which the detective is never sure of his precise location, his destination, his suspect, or
his suspect’s culpability, he finally resolves the case and catches his man. His doubts
remain, however. Is his suspect the guilty party? Is there a guilty party at all? If so, of
what crime is he guilty? Has the detective resolved anything at all, or has he simply
created a fantasy world in which he becomes the visionary, seeing things for what he
believes them to be?
This dilemma between what is real and what is imagined is played out in exploring
racism in American law. In her book The Alchemy of Race and Rights, 1 Patricia
Williams sees her world awash in sub-surface anti-black racism and is pained to the core
with this sight, only to then ask, “[h]ow can I be sure I’m right?” 2 She is a detective,
gathering evidence of racism, breadcrumbs leading to the racist, the root of it all. She is
predictably frustrated: just when she has the culprit in sight, he steps back, or just out of
view, and she must resume pursuit. She cannot apprehend her racist through linear
investigation, through following the reporter’s string. She must gather breadcrumbs from
around his camp and trap him. She must find the racist as one finds a black hole 3 : by
detecting not the racist himself, but by measuring the racist’s effects on his externalities. 4
∗

2007 Juris Doctor, Boston College Law School. M.A. University of Bradford, United Kingdom. B.A. St.
Louis University. I am immeasurably thankful to Professor Anthony Paul Farley for his advice,
encouragement, and constant support. I am also thankful to Dr. Lawrence Barmann, who started me off.
1
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
2
Reginald Leamon Robinson takes issue with the broad structural framework that Williams is trying to
sense in her work. He echoes her words in suggesting that Critical Race Theory fails to ask whether one
“becomes the structure by believing in it before she sees white structural oppression. Is she co-creating it?
Or has she acquired the Shadow’s mystical ability to ‘know’ intuitively only what already exists in the
heart of the Law?” Compare Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Sacred Way of Tibetan CRT Kung Fu: Can
Race Crits Teach the Shadow’s Mystical Insight and Help Law Students “Know” White Structural
Oppression in the Heart of the First-Year Curriculum? A Critical Rejoinder to Dorothy A. Brown, 10
MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 376 (2005), with WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 51. By questioning herself, however,
Williams has taken a step beyond the objects of Robinson’s critique and questions the very structure that
Robinson attacks.
3
The idea of the astronomical phenomenon of a black hole compares well with the idea of a black man as
criminal. Both in their own realm are greatly feared for the perceived threat that objects with substance and
value (spaceships, planets, whites, pure and virginal women) will fall into their grasp, in the process being
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The United States Supreme Court, in passing judgment on the required standard of
proof for a showing of discrimination, beyond shielding the racist from direct detection,
made it nearly impossible to legally detect discrimination by measuring external effects.
To have a cognizable claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent,
a showing that only the racist himself can make. Discriminatory effect of the racist on
externalities, in the eyes of the law, is worthless. 5 As a result, it has become nearly
impossible to introduce a selective prosecution defense as a criminal defendant. 6 To do
so, one would have to obtain prosecution’s documents that prove selective prosecution. 7
In the realm of racial profiling, the problem is the same. 8 Although statistics show clear
disparity in stops, 9 searches, 10 arrests, and use of force, 11 they do not show actual
discriminatory intent. In fact, the Supreme Court in dicta suggested that racial profiling
is constitutional as long as some pretext to stop a motorist exists. 12 The Court wrote: “we
never held . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under
destroyed by becoming what the black hole and black man are, namely, destruction and corruption
themselves. Both the black hole and black man are mysterious objects—we don’t know what exactly the
nature is of the threat that we perceive in them, and so we avoid them, we study them from afar, we elevate
them to the status of symbols: from this hole and from this man no light shall emanate, only destruction.
4
See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 1 (Williams writes about her encounters with racism and racists, but
acknowledges that she encounters them not directly or clearly, but indirectly and always with the doubt that
what she is seeing is the shadow of something other than racism).
5
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1049-50 (1978) (citing Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239-42 (1976)).
6
DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 160 (1999).
7
Id.
8
The problem might be even worse. If we adopt Ian F. Haney López’s view of “common sense racism”—
which is nearly synonymous with notions of institutional racism—which does not require hatred or
prejudice of individuals to distribute privileges and burdens along racial lines, then there is no “intent” to
commit racist acts. John O. Calmore, Displacing the Common Sense Intrusion of Whiteness from Within
and Without: “The Chicano Fight for Justice in East L.A.,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2004) (reviewing
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2002)). For Haney López,
racism is usually not the manifest, virulent form taken under Jim Crow or the Civil Rights Movement. See
id. Instead, it is “the product of indifference; the failure to challenge existing beliefs about what race is.”
Id. at 1524. Without persistent challenge, says Haney López, the existing racial hierarchy will be
perpetuated. Id. Haney López’s theory has influenced other thinkers, including Professor Philomena
Essed, Andrew Kernahan, and Deseriee Kennedy. Id. at 1525-26. It also may inform Patricia Williams’s
ambivalence as well as answer critics of this article who argue that they know of no particular person who
is a member of the admittedly vague “white male dominant power structure.” Compare id. at 1535
(“Pointing out racism is like chasing a will-o’-the-wisp; race is retro.”), with WILLIAMS, supra note 1.
Without abandoning my belief that 1950s virulent racism still exists, Haney López offers another type of
racism that exists side-by-side with the more obvious virulent form and is important to consider when
speaking in terms in which this article does.
9
INSTITUTE ON RACE AND JUSTICE, RACIAL PROFILING DATA RESOURCE COLLECTION CENTER,
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, STOP DISPARITIES, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/reporting/
tablegen.php (select all reports, type of jurisdiction, select all, stop disparities) [hereinafter NORTHEASTERN
STUDY, STOPS].
10
INSTITUTE ON RACE AND JUSTICE, RACIAL PROFILING DATA RESOURCE COLLECTION CENTER,
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, SEARCH DISPARITIES, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/reporting/
tablegen.php (select all reports, type of jurisdiction, select all, search disparities) [hereinafter
NORTHEASTERN STUDY, SEARCHES].
11
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NCJ 207845, CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY 16 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp02.pdf [hereinafter CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC].
12
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
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the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.” 13 The
Court went on to clarify its position: “a traffic-violation arrest . . . would not be rendered
invalid by the fact that it was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search.’” 14 Even if Williams
could name the racist, she would not be able to bring a cognizable claim against him.
Williams’s dilemma and the Supreme Court ruling illustrate the fundamental
problem of postmodern legal analysis, which is one of legitimacy. Such analysis
attempts to deny the traditional viewpoint that the law is a body whole and just, meaning
that it is logically constructed on a foundation of fairness to the many groups that
participate in it as judges, jurors, lawyers, parties, and defendants. Instead, postmodern
legal analysis views the law as a disunified body, with different meanings depending on
the person from whose standpoint we are observing the law. The law is, therefore, just
for one group of participants, unjust for another. Therein lies the problem with
postmodern legal analysis’s legitimacy. To be legitimate—to be literally real, in Jacques
Lacan’s words—one must speak, be heard, and be believed. 15 When the traditional,
dominant legal-political system is the only and ultimate validator of speech and its
definitions explicitly exclude the postmodern approach, how does that approach gain
legitimacy?
It does not. That is, it does not by the traditional modernist method of changing
doctrine through the dominant legislative or judicial process. 16 It can gain legitimacy
only by convincing people individually, showing over time that its approach is valid.
One way to do this is to write, and therefore to speak, and by so doing, have readers and
hearers believe in the postmodern approach. 17 If the reader believes in the words written,
those words become real. If enough readers believe, the legal-political doctrine will
follow by adopting the postmodern approach.
Gaining legitimacy is not merely an academic pursuit, since people commit fewer
crimes to the extent that they view the legal system under which they live as legitimate. 18
When one views this legal system as legitimate, she internalizes the mores reflected in
that system. 19 The existence of racial profiling and the Court’s and legislatures’
imprimatur on it delegitimize the system for thousands, if not millions, of black
Americans. 20 These people are less likely to value their system of justice as a fair one,
and are therefore more likely to become the criminals they are already assumed to be. 21
When one segment of the population is treated unfairly, we all suffer. It is,
therefore, important for us all to understand how the criminal justice system operates:
13

Id. at 812.
Id. at 813 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221, n.1 (1973)).
15
JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK I: FREUD’S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE 1953-1954
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., John Forrester trans., W.W. Norton & Company 1988) (1975).
16
Changing doctrine in this way entails criticizing extant doctrine and proposing a new doctrine that still
fits the paradigm of the status quo. From a postmodern perspective this is impossible, just as it is troubling
for supporters of Critical Legal Studies to hear the question that killed the CLS movement: “What would
you put in its place?” Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992).
17
See FRIGGA HAUG, BEYOND FEMALE MASOCHISM: MEMORY-WORK AND POLITICS (Rodney Livingstone
trans., Verso 1992) (1992) on the importance and revolutionary power of writing. See also LACAN, supra
note 15.
18
COLE, supra note 6, at 172.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
14
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what motivates it, what its methods are, and how it gains legitimacy in one person’s eyes
and loses legitimacy for many others. The traffic stop is the entry point for many people
into the criminal justice system, and racial profiling serves a prominent role in selecting
black Americans for entry into this system at a rate higher than that for white Americans
and most often without justification. Attention must be paid, and legitimacy given, to the
voice of the America that sees racial profiling for the unjustified harm that it does. We
must accept the voice of the hysteric as he speaks out against the voice of the master,
telling us that blacks are more prone to crime, and therefore need to be racially profiled. 22
This article is an attempt to speak, and thereby have heard and believed, a
postmodern approach to the issue of the terms “Law Abiding Citizen” and “Criminal” as
they are manifest in racial profiling. This essay explores why people racially profile, why
it is important that this knowledge be discussed, and what effect this discussion may have
on racial profiling. We can start with the terms “Law Abiding Citizen” and “Criminal.”
These terms are social constructs, created by the white dominant power structure, 23
consisting of legislatures, courts, police, prosecutors, and others within the dominant
legal-political infrastructure. 24 They are created in order to maintain this infrastructure’s
power through, as the title of this article and Lacan’s theories suggest, being real. As
George Orwell stated in 1984, power exists to perpetuate power. 25 Lacan finds this
power in being able to speak, define the world and people in it, be heard and be believed,
and thereby become real. 26 The white dominant power structure desires this, as do other
structures and individuals. It gains this reality by defining itself and its individuals
(whites) as Law Abiding Citizens through the definition of Others (blacks and, to a lesser

22

See STUART HENRY & DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, CONSTITUTIVE CRIMINOLOGY: BEYOND
POSTMODERNISM 33 (1996) on Lacan’s discourses of the master, university, and hysteric.
23
Throughout this article, I use the term “white dominant power structure,” “white male dominant power
structure,” and other similar variants to describe the largest congregation of power in America today. This
power is not all white, nor is it all male, though white males comprise the vast majority of member slots in
this power structure. I thus adopt a broad structuralist framework, something that Reginald Leamon
Robinson both accepts and derides. Reginald Leamon Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity,
and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1361,
1409-10 (2004). He accepts that “white society uses force, violence, and public authority to ‘encourage’
blacks to co-create their personal experiences and social worlds through race, racial identity, and race
consciousness.” Id. He goes on, however, to deride this focus on the structure because, for him, it robs
racial minorities of their human agency, their ability to create their realities. Writes Robinson: “ordinary
people [are] . . . human gods who simply play the role of victims.” Id. at 1369. Blacks, in the face of white
oppression, are “powerful reality creators, earthly gods who name and thus co-create their realities” as an
oppressed minority. Id. at 1381. In this article, I examine one aspect of American racism, not intending to
take anything away from people’s ability to act. Indeed, when Robinson mentions Homer Adolphus Plessy
and Rosa Parks as two examples of people who had and used their agency to be other-than-victims, id. at
1392, I can imagine that if all black “victims” took such agency, racism would be defeated. On the other
hand, I cannot adopt Robinson’s view that “whites cannot thus victimize minorities [because] . . .
victimization is an attitude, and it must be self-imposed.” Robinson, supra note 2, at 363.
24
Thanks to Professor Anthony Paul Farley and many others for supporting this theory, which is
everywhere and nowhere at the same time and therefore cannot be documented with modernist logic and
construction.
25
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 266 (1977), in which O’Brien explicates society’s system of power to
Winston: “The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we
are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness; only power, pure power.”
26
See generally LACAN, supra note 15 (in which Lacan puts much stress on people’s desire to be real, and
achieving such reality through speech and others).
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extent, other minorities and the poor) as Criminal. 27 For what purpose? For none other
than to be real and maintain the power it already has.
¶9
As I have already noted, the Court and legislatures have declared racial profiling to
be constitutional and acceptable. 28 This power structure, composed mainly of wealthy
white males, therefore accepts a policing method that reinforces segregation and creates
fear and mistrust between blacks and whites. 29 By establishing this racist antagonism, the
power structure takes its place as a defense of one against the aggression of the other. In
a society in which blackness itself has become criminalized, 30 the power structure will
come to define whiteness as law abiding. The split is therefore complete: Black remains
Criminal, and White, as a mirror to Black’s constructed Criminality, becomes Law
Abiding. 31
¶10
To effect the construction of White as Law Abiding and Black as Criminal, the
power structure has had to construct race itself. Race must be seen as biologically, not
socially, determined. 32 The Court has served this end in a number of seminal cases. The
Court in Terry v. Ohio set the stage for acceptance of racial profiling. 33 Whren v. United
States, we have already seen, holds racial profiling to be constitutional and bars any claim
of discrimination from being brought under the Fourth Amendment, instead referring the
litigant to the Fourteenth Amendment and all of its problems with proving discriminatory
intent. 34 The Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, in holding that law enforcement
officers do not have to inform people that they may refuse a request to search their bodies
or automobiles, intentionally exploits the ignorance of society as to the law. 35 The Court
in Florida v. Bostick gave officers the ability to target whomever they please. 36 The
results of these cases point to one end goal: the social construction of race, the reifying of
race, and the subsequent differencing of Black and White. 37 If racism is defined as the
process of “raceing,” or creating race, then these decisions are racist. In fact, racism is
everywhere in the criminal justice system: in racial profiling, in jury selection, 38 in death
27

See LACAN, supra note 15, at 83 on mirror relations. See also Liyah Kaprice Brown, Why Police
Desegregation Fails as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black
Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 788 (“An examination of police desegregation and
subsequent operational needs case law suggests that police departments historically have connected Blacks
with criminal behavior.”). See generally FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam
Markmann trans., Grove Press 1967) (1952).
28
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why ‘Driving While Black’ Matters, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 291 (1999).
29
U.S. DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THREAT AND HUMILIATION:
RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES xiv (2004),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/rp_report.pdf [hereinafter THREAT AND HUMILIATION].
30
Harris, supra note 28, at 292.
31
See LACAN, supra note 15, at 83 on mirror relations.
32
Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 476 (1997).
33
392 U.S. 1, 13-14 & n.9 (1968) (“Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes,
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime. . . . [Police] may be conducting a
dragnet search of all teenagers in a particular section of the city for weapons because they have heard
rumors of an impending gang fight.”).
34
517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
35
COLE, supra note 6, at 29-30 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
36
Id. at 21 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
37
Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 965-66 (2002) (“[T]he
race-constructing role the Court performs in the Fourth Amendment context . . . help[s] to highlight the
Court’s complicity in, and legitimation of, police practices that target people of color.”).
38
COLE, supra note 6, at 104.
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sentencing, 39 everywhere. 40 The final result is a dual system of justice, two lenses
through which we view the same structure. Through one lens, we see blacks as criminals
and suspects. Through another lens, we see whites as law-abiding citizens and assumedto-be-virtuous. 41
¶11
This dual system of justice has existed since blacks’ first existence in America and
has characterized blacks as “at risk” for police antagonism and violence while whites
enjoyed police service and protection. 42 Racial profiling is perpetuated by this dual
system in which whites respond positively to a system that treats them with courtesy,
professionalism, and respect, and blacks respond negatively since they are treated with
hostility and sub-par and offensive policing. 43 These two different ways of viewing law
enforcement increase the gap between White and Black, thus providing an ever greater
venue in which the dominant power structure can establish its necessity. Black views of
the system may also increase the incidence of black crime, thus making the power
structure’s speech about black criminality real. Whites, who legitimize the system, are
primed to reject the voice of Black America, because it seems to be the voice of Criminal
America. White and Black both become more entrenched in their beliefs, and the power
structure gains more and more purchase on necessity.
¶12
Williams, the detective, had to sense the black hole of racism by looking at its
external effects. 44 We must do the same. Nowhere will we find a document stating
discriminatory intent in the creation of the Law-Abiding Citizen and Criminal. 45 We will
find, however, discriminatory effect evincing systemic racism and breakdown. 46 We will
find this effect by examining the issue of racial profiling through the theories of four
people. 47 First, Jacques Lacan’s theories on the ego, speech, and language will provide a
solid psychoanalytical base upon which we can operate. 48 Second, Frantz Fanon’s view
of relations between the European colonizer and the African colonized, as applicable
today in America as ever, will bring Lacan’s theories into the realm of race and society. 49
Third, Professor Anthony Paul Farley’s thinking on race relations as a center of sadistmasochist pleasure will take us across the Atlantic and deposit us squarely in
39

Id. at 93.
Id. at 139.
41
Imani Perry suggests this duality in her “sympathetic occupation” approach to literature and the law.
Imani Perry, Occupying the Universal, Embodying the Subject: African American Literary Jurisprudence,
17 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 97, 98 (2005). In this approach, Perry speaks of “double consciousness,” or
the reality of the black subject as both a member of society and yet subject to lawless treatment. Id. at 100.
In this article we speak of a split between White and Black, whereas Perry speaks of a split within Black
himself. The split, however, between Law Abiding and Criminal, is the same.
42
Brown, supra note 27, at 758-59.
43
Id. at 793.
44
See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 1.
45
See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE & ARLETTE EL KAÏM-SARTRE, ON GENOCIDE AND A SUMMARY OF THE
EVIDENCE AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL 58 (1968) in which JeanPaul Sartre claims American forces are committing genocide in the Vietnam War: “Hitler had proclaimed it
his deliberate intent to exterminate the Jews. . . . The American government has avoided making such clear
statements.”
46
Honorable Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L.
REV. 481, 482-83 (2005).
47
Thanks to Professor Anthony Paul Farley for suggesting the issue of racial profiling.
48
See generally LACAN, supra note 15, which is most helpful in understanding his views on ego, speech,
and language.
49
FANON, supra note 27.
40
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contemporary America with a postmodern, psychoanalytic, and bold and cutting edge
view into race relations. 50 Throughout, I will also refer to Professor Bernard Harcourt’s
ideology-imagery cycle. 51 By invoking these writers, I hope to explore why people
racially profile, why it is important that this knowledge be discussed, and what effect a
discussion of these two questions might have on the existence and prevalence of racial
profiling in American society. To summarize and frame these questions and their
answers, I will introduce some of Michel Foucault’s theories of power as they relate to
the theories of the four thinkers already mentioned. Finally, I will suggest some actions
that can be taken to address the problem of racial profiling. I start, however, with an
introduction to the issue of racial profiling in America.
II. RACIAL PROFILING
¶13

Racial profiling occurs when law enforcement officials—in the absence of a
suspect-specific description—selectively consider race in deciding when to investigate,
arrest, and prosecute. 52 Racial profiling is a problem because it is a pervasive practice
that affects a large number of people, impacting them in both legal and psychological
ways. Statistical evidence supports this view. Furthermore, the law provides little
protection to the victim of racial profiling and police departments regularly fail to comply
with anti-racial profiling legislation. Finally, it is possible that the problem is getting
worse.
A. Indicators of Racial Profiling

¶14

As of 2004, thirty-two million Americans—one out of nine people—have reported
that they have been the victims of racial profiling. 53 Approximately eighty-seven million
Americans are at a high risk of being subjected to future racial profiling during their
lifetime. 54 Racial profiling occurs in almost every context of people’s lives: while
driving, while walking, while traveling through airports, while shopping, while at home,
and while traveling to and from places of worship. 55 Statistics from a study conducted by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics 56 show that blacks are stopped, searched, and arrested at a
rate disproportionately high to their prevalence in the general population and in relation
to whites. State and federal protections against racial profiling continue to be grossly
inadequate, 57 and courts, as we have already seen, affirm the constitutionality of the
practice. Where there is legislation, police departments may fail to comply with its
requirements. 58 They actually admit that racial profiling happens: when a black school
50

See generally Farley, supra note 32.
See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship
Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in Southern Antebellum and
Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (1995).
52
See THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at ix.
53
Id. at xiv.
54
Id. at vi.
55
Id. at vi-vii.
56
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, supra note 11, at v, 7, 9-10.
57
THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at vii.
58
RHODE ISLAND AFFILIATE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING
IN RHODE ISLAND: AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2005) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND
51

69
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teacher in San Carlos, California was racially profiled, he asked the officer if he had been
pulled over because of his race. The officer answered, “We do, in fact, profile here
around drugs. How do you expect . . . [us to] do our jobs?” 59 There is some evidence
that racial profiling may be getting worse. 60 The recent debate in California surrounding
the proposed “Classification by Race, Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin Initiative”
suggests that in general white society is only in favor of addressing racial profiling
through collection of data to the extent that its interests are served. 61
¶15
A Los Angeles Police Department study found that twenty-five percent of its
officers believed that “racial bias (prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority
citizens currently exists” and that such bias “may lead to the use of excessive force.” 62
Whether it consists of the use of nightsticks, fists, or overly tight handcuffs, this force is
the tip of the iceberg that constitutes the psychological effect of racial profiling on its
victims. In the immediate moment of racial profiling, the victim of such profiling may
feel humiliated, 63 disparately treated, 64 angry, and afraid. 65 At a deeper level, the victim
may feel as if there is nothing he can do to escape the assumption that he is a criminal. 66
When engaging in racial profiling, the police officer assails the black person’s very
“sense of self.” Fruitless searches of body and car will often not be enough to prove to
the officer that the black person is anything but Criminal. 67 Initially, the black person
may sense the definition of inferiority that society places upon him as an external force.
In the final step, racial profiling and its attendant circumstances may lead to the
psychological disappearance of the black person’s self as he would define it. This is the
“nobodying” of the Black of which Anthony Farley speaks.68 This is, as Frantz Fanon 69
and Devon Carbado describe, the defining of Black only as White would define him. 70
This is how one race rejects the justice system and another legitimizes it. In this process,
Black becomes Criminal, White becomes Law Abiding, 71 and the dominant power
structure takes its place as the necessary wedge between the two.
AFFILIATE]; see also NORTHEASTERN STUDY, STOPS, supra note 9 (reporting that Hutchinson, Kansas
provided data on an unusually low number of traffic stops and was unable to explain why).
59
THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at 3.
60
RHODE ISLAND AFFILIATE, supra note 58, at 18; see also RHODE ISLAND AFFILIATE, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING IN RHODE ISLAND: AN UPDATE 2 (2005)
(updating the Rhode Island Affiliate’s original report, supra note 58).
61
Richa Amar, Unequal Protection and The Racial Privacy Initiative, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1300
(2005).
62
COLE, supra note 6, at 22.
63
THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at 4.
64
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of New Jersey Sues Manalapan Police for
Targeting African American Youths (Aug. 25, 2004), http://www.aclu-nj.org/pressroom/
aclunjsuesmanalapanpolicef.htm [hereinafter ACLU Sues Manalapan Police].
65
THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at 21.
66
Harris, supra note 28, at 291.
67
Carbado, supra note 37, at 1019-20.
68
Farley, supra note 32, at 491.
69
FANON, supra note 27, at 107.
70
Carbado, supra note 37, at 948.
71
Jerry Kang takes a social cognition approach to the social construction of race. Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493-94 (2005). Kang discusses studies that show that “the mere
image of a black face—and a subliminal one at that—could activate a Black racial schema.” Id. at 1505.
He finds, therefore, a prejudicial bias against blacks, a false belief that “racial minorities [are] violent
criminals.” Id. at 1491-97. Kang concludes from his empirical studies that police officers will shoot black
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¶16

This nobodying of the Black and re-creation of White as Law Abiding is not a
random process. This is not a process that cannot be discerned. This is a process that is
well documented and is being encouraged and enabled by our justice system.
¶17
Statistical studies performed by Northeastern University 72 and the Bureau of Justice
Statistics 73 show clear racial disparities in all stages of a traffic stop. Both studies,
furthermore, report that police found criminal evidence (weapons and drugs) in whiteoccupied and black-occupied automobiles at either an identical or a higher rate, in white
automobiles than in black automobiles. 74 Captain Ron Davis of the Oakland Police
Department has said, “[r]acial profiling . . . is one of the most ineffective strategies . . . .
It’s basically saying you don’t want to learn about your community, you don’t want to
learn about people’s behavior.” 75
B. Government (In)action
¶18

Given the government’s own necessary conclusion that whites are more likely to be
criminals, and yet blacks are stopped more often, 76 one would assume that the
government would take steps to defeat the practice of racial profiling once and for all. In
fact, however, racial profiling is now official policy in many jurisdictions. The Police
Executive Research Forum, a think tank for law enforcement agencies, advocates the use
of race as one factor among others in policing when police possess credible, locally
relevant information that links persons of a specific race to a specific crime. 77 The
federal Guidelines permit racial profiling when there is evidence linking persons of a
“certain race” to a “particular criminal incident.” 78 Michael R. Smith is the Director of
the Department of Criminology at the University of South Carolina. No enemy of racebased policing, he notes that other policies and statutes “implicitly allow for the
consideration of race as one factor among others by only prohibiting stops based solely
on race. . . . [S]ome state and local law enforcement agencies have, for the first time,
expressly codified the disparate treatment of citizens by race and ethnicity.” 79 The
problem with this method of policing is that terms such as “credible, locally relevant
information,” “specific crime,” “certain race,” and “particular criminal enterprise,” can be
men faster than they will shoot white men. Id. at 1525. Kang also finds that socially dominant groups
(whites) have implicit bias against subordinate groups (non-whites). Id. at 1512. Kang goes on to state that
local news media’s portrayal of black-alleged criminals—disproportionate to the portrayal of white-alleged
criminals and shown in a more sinister light than such white criminals—plays an important role in creating
this implicit bias. Id. at 1495. Kang’s research therefore suggests the efficacy of racial profiling in
establishing whites as law abiding and blacks as criminal.
72
See generally NORTHEASTERN STUDY, STOPS, supra note 9.
73
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, supra note 11, at v, 7-10, 18.
74
See id. at 14; see generally NORTHEASTERN STUDY, STOPS, supra note 9.
75
THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at 21.
76
See CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, supra note 11, at v, 7-9, 14: The Bureau report stated
that (1) blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to experience police threat or use of force
during contact with the police, (2) blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to be arrested, (3)
blacks were more likely than whites to be handcuffed, and (4) black drivers generally had worse outcomes
from police contact than did white drivers. The Bureau also noted, ironically, that searches of black drivers
or their vehicles were less likely to produce criminal evidence than searches of white drivers or their
vehicles.
77
Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219, 229 (2005).
78
Id.
79
Id.
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manipulated to serve whatever notion of policing the law enforcement official previously
had. The statistics suggest that the practice is one that accuses blacks and exonerates
whites before the fact and despite the facts.
¶19
Racial profiling by law enforcement officials has been endorsed by the Supreme
Court. Two decisions, Terry v. Ohio 80 and Whren v. United States, 81 are most important
in this regard. Terry put the country on a path that led to modern-day racial profiling, and
Whren, implicitly overturning Terry’s limited holding, actually established the
constitutionality of racial profiling.
C. Terry v. Ohio
¶20

Terry v. Ohio, decided in 1968, began the modern era of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Taking on “serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth
Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman
investigating suspicious circumstances,” 82 the Court wrote that these questions were
“difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity—issues
which have never before been squarely presented to the Court.” 83
1. Facts of Terry

¶21

In Terry, an officer observed three men apparently “casing a job, a stick-up” of a
store. 84 While doing nothing illegal per se, the men were walking up and down the street,
talking with each other and peering in the store window between five and six times
apiece. 85 The officer approached the men, identified himself as an officer, and asked for
their names. 86 When the men “mumbled something” in response, the officer “grabbed
petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two, with Terry
between [the officer] and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing.” 87 The
officer felt a pistol. 88 He removed Terry’s overcoat and removed a thirty-eight caliber
revolver. 89 He proceeded to search the other men, finding a gun in the outer pocket of
one of the other men. 90 At issue was whether this search was constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
2. The Terry Court on Racial Profiling

¶22

At first, the Court acknowledged two things that seemed to bode well for Terry as
well as minorities who in the future would be racially profiled under Terry jurisprudence.
First, the Court wrote that it “has always recognized, ‘[no] right is held more sacred, or is
80

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
82
Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.
83
Id. at 9-10.
84
Id. at 6.
85
Id.
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Id. at 6-7.
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Id. at 7.
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Id.
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Id.
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more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’” 91 Second, the Court acknowledged
“[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which
minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain.” 92 Further, in a footnote the
Court cited the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, which acknowledged police misuse of field interrogations simply to engage in
“aggressive patrol,” and which had caused friction between police and minority groups. 93
¶23
The Court took a bold step in suggesting the psychology and racism underlying
such “aggressive patrolling”:
[I]t cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-community
tensions. This is particularly true in situations where the “stop and frisk”
of youths or minority group members is “motivated by the officers’
perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim
sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to
undermine police control of the streets.” 94
¶24

The Court here implicates the theories discussed in this article and discusses what
would come to be called racial profiling. But this is as far as the Court went. Signaling
that it would not consider such systemic racism in its decision, the Court implicitly
accepted the constitutionality of a police “dragnet search of all teenagers in a particular
section of the city for weapons because they have heard rumors of an impending gang
fight.” 95 By focusing law enforcement on a particular part of the city and a particular
crime (gang activity), police engage in racial profiling in a way that is difficult to
acknowledge in court as impermissible race-based police behavior. Finally, Terry being
ultimately about the admissibility of the discovered gun into evidence under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court wrote that the “wholesale harassment . . . of which minority
groups . . . frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence
from any criminal trial.” 96 Despite the Court writing that “[e]ver since its inception, the
rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been
recognized as a principle mode of discouraging lawless police conduct,” 97 it rejected the
notion that minorities, “particularly Negroes,” could or would be helped by such
constitutional protection. One can, however, imagine a regime in which unwarranted
searches and seizures can lead to arrests only when weapons were found that could be
used immediately to harm the police officer or others. Other contraband that does not
threaten immediate harm would simply be confiscated and no arrest would be made.
This regime would be in line with Terry’s holding, as we shall see.

91

Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
Id. at 14.
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Id. at 15 n.11.
94
Id. (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)).
95
Id. at 14 n.9.
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Id. at 14-15.
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3. Terry’s Holding
¶25

Acknowledging that the “stop and frisk” is “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,” 98 the Court
held for the State of Ohio in an apparently limited holding. The Court held that for a
search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer must (1) observe
unusual conduct, which (2) leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal activity is
afoot, and (3) that the subject of his suspicion is armed and presently dangerous. 99 The
officer may then, “for the protection of himself and others in the area . . . conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.” 100 This limited holding thus is consistent
with allowing searches and seizures with reason short of probable cause: the “interest of
the police officer . . . to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.” 101 While
the holding seems appropriately limited, the Court’s reasoning to get to its holding
provides a framework in which racial profiling is legally sanctioned.
4. Terry Court’s Reasoning

¶26

First, the Court sets the stage by holding that the “probable cause” standard applies
only to the “Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment,” that is, that only searches
following the obtainment of a warrant require probable cause. 102 “[N]ecessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat” 103 is not
subjected to the warrant procedure and is to be tested by “the Fourth Amendment’s
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 104 This is the
“reasonable suspicion” standard, coined by Justice Douglas in his dissent. 105 The
problems with this are two: first, there is arguably no “Warrant Clause” in the Fourth
Amendment, 106 and second, Terry discourages the police from seeking warrants. If the
police can show necessarily swift action, they need not seek a warrant and need not
satisfy the probable cause standard.
5. Terry’s Two-Prong Test

¶27

Terry establishes a two-prong test to determine whether a seizure and search is
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. First, the officer’s action must have been
justified at its inception, meaning that “the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
98

Id. at 17.
Id. at 30.
100
Id.
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Id. at 23.
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Id. at 20.
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Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonably warrants that intrusion.” 107 This is an objective test that asks whether the facts
would “warrant a man of reasonable caution” to take steps to seize and search. With such
a porous reasonable person standard, race can easily be taken into account, particularly
when statistics have been built up over years of racial profiling showing that more blacks
are arrested in a particular area than are whites, or if officers have heard “rumors,”
whatever those are, of a gang fight in the black part of the city. In this case, the
reasonable person standard merely gives officers more discretion and does nothing to
address racial profiling, if not provide a constitutional framework for it to flourish.
¶28
The second prong may have served to hinder racial profiling, though it has been
shown to be ineffective. Once the official’s action in seizing and searching is justified, it
then has to be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place. If the Court’s decision were taken seriously, then the only
search an officer can constitutionally make is one for weapons that could be immediately
used to harm the officer or others in the area. Thus, an officer would be unable to search
a car that was pulled over because of a traffic violation or because the driver did not have
her seatbelt on. Similarly, an officer could not pull over drivers of a particular type of car
because that car type is statistically more likely to be used to haul drugs. Police officers
could not target known drug trafficking routes more, and certainly could not target blacks
believed to represent a disproportionate percentage of drug couriers, even if it were true.
¶29
In his dissent, Justice Douglas portended doom by describing racial profiling: “if
the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they
do not like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ him in their discretion, we
enter a new regime.” 108 Unfortunately, this new regime has existed for years, decades,
and centuries for people whose cut of their jib is simply their black skin.
D. Whren v. United States
¶30

Whren v. United States, 109 decided in 1996, addressed the issue of police traffic
stops and suggested how the limited holding in Terry has been broadened to encompass a
very great deal more than the Terry court envisaged in the realm of constitutional
searches and seizures.
1. Facts in Whren

¶31

In Whren, two plainclothes officers, driving an unmarked police car in a “high drug
area” of the District of Columbia, witnessed the driver of a Nissan Pathfinder violate a
number of traffic laws. 110 One of the officers, catching up to the truck, which had sped
off after the officers executed a U-turn to investigate the truck, stepped up to the driver’s
door. 111 Looking into the truck, the officer saw two large bags of what appeared to be
crack cocaine. Petitioners were arrested, charged, and convicted under a number of
federal drug laws. 112
107

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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2. Whren Court’s Ruling
¶32

Justice Scalia delivered the majority’s opinion, holding that the officers had
probable cause to believe petitioners had violated the traffic code. 113 Thus, the stop was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence found admissible, and Petitioners’
convictions affirmed. 114
¶33
Petitioners contended that “the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely
regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible.” 115
Thus, a police officer could, at his discretion, stop almost any motorist on a technical
violation. This, argued Petitioners, creates a temptation to use traffic stops to investigate
non-traffic violations, like gun or drug violations. 116 Finally, Petitioners argued that this
may lead police to make traffic stops based on impermissible factors such as race. 117
Petitioners argued that to avoid this danger, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops
should not be the “normal one” of probable cause, but rather “whether a police officer,
acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the given reason.” 118 Along the way to
rejecting this argument and succinct description of racial profiling, the Court weakens, if
not totally defeats, the ability of future defendants to allege racial profiling in their
defense. The Court also tramples over Terry’s limited holding.
3. Does Whren Overrule Terry?
¶34

Central to its rejection is the Court’s insistence that the “reasonableness” standard
is subjective, 119 not objective as Terry suggested. The Court wrote: “it seems to us
somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the
collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable
officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.” 120 This assertion of a
subjective standard does a few things.
¶35
It rejects the notion that statistics regarding disparities in traffic stops have any role
to play in showing unconstitutionally pretextual stops. Instead, it places all racism and
pretext in the individual officer. It thus preserves the integrity of the system as a whole,
finding racism, if at all, in individual aberrations.
¶36
This would be fine if a petitioner could present evidence about an individual
officer’s pretextual stop, but the Court forecloses that possibility as well. It writes: “we
[have] never held . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary. . . .
We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their
legal justification.” 121 In other words, it does not matter if racism motivated the stop. As
long as there is a pretext—the traffic stop to which Petitioners referred—the officer’s real
113
114
115
116
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intent is irrelevant. Under either an objective or subjective standard, therefore,
petitioners have no recourse to challenge the stop.
¶37
Whren also serves to expand the Terry holding beyond its limited scope. The Court
wrote: “a lawful postarrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the fact
that it was not motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies such searches.” 122
¶38
Finally, the Whren Court holds that the proper basis for challenging a stop on a
racial profiling theory is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 123 This
forces victims of racial profiling to show discriminatory intent—a feat nearly impossible
under today’s jurisprudence.
E. Some Tentative Conclusions
¶39

A few things are clear at this point. First, racial profiling is a systemic problem.
Second, the dominant power structure knows that it exists and that it is ineffective.
Third, that power structure encourages and enables racial profiling through legislation,
policy, and Court decisions. Fourth, the construction of race—namely, Black as Criminal
and White as Law Abiding—is the foundation upon which racial profiling exists and
operates. Why and how does the white dominant power structure construct race in this
way? Lacan, Fanon, and Farley help to answer this question. I now consider racial
profiling in light of their theories.
III. LACAN

¶40

Williams’s racist is ever just out of reach because she cannot apprehend him until
she has determined why he is racist, and to do that would mean that she understands
primitive, fundamental motives for human action. The question “why is he racist?” is
only another way of asking “why does he act?” It is, therefore, a pursuit that Williams
takes on bravely, but one that has as clear an answer as asking for proof of the nature of
god. With any answer comes many more questions.
A. Rejection of the Other to Establish the Self

¶41

French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan offers one answer. His answer is founded on
a fundamental principle which must first be understood. Lacan, like Williams, is engaged
in an existential pursuit of a human nature, which may or may not be there. 124 Where
Williams is searching for the racist, Lacan is searching for human nature. He finds it in
the individual’s ego, established through speech and language vis-à-vis the Other. 125
When, therefore, a law enforcement officer chooses how to police, he does so based on
his perceptions of this Other, established over a foundation of racial profiling. Even if
the officer is not racist, the officer “races,” in that he participates in a system that
constructs race. The Court explicitly allows this perpetuation of creating the law
122

Id. at 813.
Id.
124
See LACAN, supra note 15, at 53-63, in which Lacan describes the ego alongside such words as defense,
refusal, misunderstanding, not autonomous, the seat of illusions, and the master of errors.
125
See id. at 52; see also JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK II: THE EGO IN
FREUD’S THEORY AND IN THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 244 (Sylvana Tomaselli trans., W.W.
Norton & Company 1988) (1978).
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enforcement self through the criminalization of the black person. It does so by allowing
the officer to use his “previous experience” in detecting illegal activity. 126 Where this
previous experience was gained in a milieu of racial profiling, the officer will continue to
define himself as law abiding in response to his observation of predominately black
criminology.
¶42
The officer’s observation of this Other as Criminal is as fragile as Lacan’s search
for human nature, in which Lacan refers to ego, speech, and language as illusions,
misunderstandings, mistakes, and lies. 127 Lacan notes even that language exists in order
to prevent understanding. 128 Lacan, therefore, suggests that human nature, if anything, is
founded in illusion, mistake, and a positive attempt to misunderstand. The officer who
defines himself as law abiding in response to the criminality he observes is a case in
point. How can it be otherwise when whites tend to possess more drugs and weapons,
and use more drugs, than blacks, yet blacks are more likely to be arrested for such
activities? 129
¶43
Seeming to sabotage his investigation from the start, Lacan actually approaches
human nature and relations from a valid and useful existential perspective. Lacan rejects
the notion that we are individual “selves” capable of existing outside of relations with
others. 130 Instead, he argues that we establish ourselves—our egos, which are themselves
illusory social constructs—through relations with others. 131 More specifically, we defend
ourselves against others and reject them in order to establish ourselves. 132 We deride
Dick’s drinking habits in order to establish ourselves as non-alcoholic. We refuse to
accept Jane’s academic achievements in order to defend against the psychic impact of the
fact that our own academic achievements are poor.
¶44
Supporters of racial profiling argue that law enforcement officials are generally
trustworthy, non-racist, and do not abuse their discretion. 133 By racially profiling, these
law-abiding officers actually tend to advance Fourth Amendment interests by rationally
limiting the intrusion on the general driving population. 134 Non-white drivers must
therefore suffer racial profiling so that assumedly white drivers can be free from traffic
stops and free from the label of Criminal. The power structure justifies its actions by
making Criminals out of blacks, with the result that whites become Law Abiding
Citizens. Blacks become seen by police as “a community of savages” in which the police
126

Honorable Charles F. Baird & Holly L. Black, Criminal Procedure—Fourth Amendment, 37 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 729, 755 (2004-2005) (quoting U.S. v. Neufeld-Nuefeld, 338 F.3d 374, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2003),
listing the factors the Court uses to analyze whether reasonable suspicion was present for a border patrol
stop).
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See LACAN, supra note 15, at 53-63, in which Lacan describes the ego alongside such words as defense,
refusal, misunderstanding, not autonomous, the seat of illusions, and the master of errors.
128
See LACAN, supra note 125, at 244.
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See THREAT AND HUMILIATION, supra note 29, at 22; see generally CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND
THE PUBLIC, supra note 11.
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See LACAN, supra note 15, at 62-63.
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See HENRY & MILOVANOVIC, supra note 22, at 27 (“affirmative postmodernists offer the notion of a
decentered subject. This indicates that the human subject is not a unified entity or even a coherent social
whole but is one or more ideological constructions, mere illusion.”).
132
See LACAN, supra note 15, at 53.
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See United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 105 (2005),
in which border guards and “most government employees” are characterized as “exercis[ing] informed
judgment . . . not wast[ing] time on dead-end adventures . . . intelligent and respectful.”
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United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
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are “outposts of law in a jungle.” 135 When white policymakers mischaracterize the
problem between police and the black community as one of black hostility and
resentment rather than one of police racism and misconduct, 136 they reject a valid (black)
opinion on the state of the justice system. The white power structure thereby rejects
Black itself, defining it as criminal and savage and establishing itself and its white
community as civilized and law abiding.
One engages in defense and rejection of others to do no less than assert his own
reality. Human relations for Lacan are mirror relations: what the Other is not, I am, and
what the Other is, I am not. One of us will be real, and one of us will therefore be
imaginary, a shadow of what is real.137 We must establish our egos, therefore, in order to
be real. By doing so, we escape the existential crisis: our egos become actual objects, the
subjective and real “I” rather than the objective and imagined-by-the-Other “me.” 138 We
thus take on that which we cannot bear to be without: existence.
The power structure rejects Black in order to be real. As a black Briton
immigrating to America and “becoming” black through the white definition of black,
Devon Carbado was racially profiled. The officers were engaging in “racial imagination
. . . [in which all blacks are] criminal.” 139 Imagination is at the heart of whites’ creation
of the black Other. Whites tend to use and possess more drugs and guns, but they
imagine the black scourge of the black crack baby emerging to be a crazed drug addict,
leading the vulnerable white population on a road of crime and prostitution. 140 Whites
imagine the black Other as everything they do not want to be. Through this rejection of
the other, whites thereby define themselves as everything they want to be.
All things logically converge. We must establish our reality by creating our ego.
We create our ego by relating to others. What others are not is what we are. Others,
therefore, must be imaginary for us to be real. We imagine the Other as bad through
defense and rejection, thereby making us good and real. The Other’s negativity positives
the self. Recall that Williams rejected the racist in order to establish herself as correct, as
insightful, as seeing. She then pierced this process by doubting herself: if the racist was
not really there, if there was no one to reject, could she be correct, insightful, and seeing?
She was left wondering whether she was the crazy doomsayer. And if she saw only what
was not really there, she herself was the imaginary Other and the deniers of the racist the
real selves.
We establish ourselves by rejecting our mirror image, portrayed in the Other. We
reject the Other’s vice, ugliness, and stupidity in order to see ourselves as the mirror
opposite: virtuous, beautiful, and intelligent. When we speak of the excellences of
others, as Confucius would have us do, 141 we self-efface, we become images to the

135
Brown, supra note 27, at 790 (quoting Sherene Razack, Outwhiting the White Guys: Men of Colour and
Peacekeeping Violence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 331, 342-43 (2002)).
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United States Sentencting Commission Hearings, March 19, 2002 (testimony of Laura Murphy,
Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington National Office) [hereinafter Hearings].
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See CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS: WITH SELECTIONS FROM TRADITIONAL COMMENTARIES 75 (Edward
Slingerland trans., Hachett Publishing Company, Inc. 2003) (ca. 500 B.C.E.).
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Other’s reality. This individual establishment process is found in groups and larger
institutions as well, but the goal is always the same: will to reality.
¶49
The power structure’s will to reality depends on inequality in the criminal justice
system. 142 Without this inequality, whites could not feel as though they are automatically
Law Abiding Citizens—they would have no intrinsic mandate to moral superiority.
America, founded and ruled by the white dominant power structure, becomes itself,
therefore, by excluding or rejecting Black. 143 The White rejection of Black takes a
number of forms. It shows itself in unnecessary verbal and physical abuse by police
officers. 144 It finds that a victim of racial profiling who passes a polygraph test in
testifying to this profiling is not telling the truth. 145 It sees disparities in encounters with
police, but fails to ask the questions that would reveal racial profiling. 146 It burdens Black
with humiliation, depression, helplessness, fear, and anger. 147 It rejects Black so that
White can be free of abuse, trusted and believed, proud, happy, able and unafraid.
B. Speech and Language
¶50

Lacan’s discussion of speech and language illustrates the machinery of the process
of rejection. 148 The illusory nature of speech and language go hand in hand with that of
the ego, so that when whites reject black declarations of police racism and misconduct,
they reject not the suggestion of impropriety, but the voice of Black itself, whatever the
message. When whites replace this black message with their own—namely, that the real
problem is black hostility and resentment toward honest police officers—they create
Black as they desire him to be. And so white language creates Black as Criminal.
¶51
Language is the conduit through which we relate to others. Because we must
establish our egos by imagining others, language exists to prevent understanding. 149 It is
false and fleeting. 150 The signifiers contained in language, such as “law-abiding citizen”
and “criminal,” are value-laden and biased interpretations of the signified, the actual
objects, people, or ideas the signifiers ostensibly represent. 151 Overenforcement of laws
in certain (black) parts of town exemplifies the way that racial profiling speaks in valueladen signifiers. Overenforcement “rests on the racial stereotype of Black lawlessness
and criminality.” 152 Its foundation is therefore one of the value-laden and obviously
142
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biased signifiers of “lawlessness” and “criminality.” Overenforcement in black
neighborhoods leads to racial profiling, pretextual stops, and illegal searches and
seizures. 153 This is speech that declares blacks to be Criminal, undeserving of
constitutional protection, and forever suspect. As a result, the Kerner Report of 1968
found that to many blacks, “police have come to symbolize [W]hite power, [W]hite
racism, and [W]hite repression. And the fact is that many police do reflect and express
these [W]hite attitudes.” 154
¶52
Signifiers have an actual meaning (veut dire) and an intended meaning (vouloir
155
dire). The veut dire of “criminal” may be “one who violates law,” and the vouloir dire
may be “black man; bad; one who should stay out of our town.” Signifiers are the visible
tip of an iceberg whose numerous regressive meanings sink deep into the dark water of
the psyche. The veut dire is hard to discern, but remembering that we use language to
define ourselves and establish our egos against the imagination, defense, and rejection of
others serves as a guide. The vouloir dire of Law-Abiding Citizen and Criminal is the
dominant power structure’s desire to split people into “good” and “bad.” This justifies
the power structure’s law enforcement and punishment schemes, makes the structure
indispensable as a mediator between the two groups of people, and, by having society
adopt the power structure’s good-bad construct, makes the structure real.
¶53
In language, the ego is conceived. 156 When one seeks to become real, one must
speak, be heard, and be believed by others. The chain of events is, therefore: discourse
(conversation with others about criminality) → truth claim (“black people are mostly
criminal”) → belief by others (“yes, black people do seem to be criminal”) → reality of
the subject (black people become Criminal and the speaker becomes the mirror opposite,
a Law-Abiding Citizen). 157 Only when others believe our truth claims can we become
real. It is, therefore, imperative that the dominant power structure convince society that
its Criminals are indeed criminals and its Law Abiding Citizens are truly law abiding. It
can do this in racial profiling by (1) having an ostensibly heartfelt and sensitive debate
over the validity of racial profiling; (2) declaring racial profiling to be an acceptable and
fact-based answer to crime; (3) engaging in racial profiling, thus exposing a higher
number of black criminals than white criminals in a given time period and place; (4)
arguing that this exposure proves that blacks commit more crimes and bolsters the need
for racial profiling; and (5) repeating the cycle until all blacks are Criminal and all whites
are Law Abiding Citizens. 158
¶54
The only way to do this is to split races into “good” and “bad.” Racial profiling
does this well. In one incident, a group of three black and three white friends were riding
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their bicycles in Manalapan, New Jersey when the police stopped all six of them. 159 The
police illegally searched the black kids without justification and called them names such
as “little punk” and “baby.” 160 The officers sent the white kids home, telling them that
they “don’t have to see this.” 161
¶55
Bernard Harcourt’s cycle of image creation suggests a similar method of “truth”
creation. 162 Harcourt’s human subject starts with an ideology and then searches for
images in the real world to expose that ideology as true. 163 These images of, say, a black
man’s mug shot after the man has allegedly just killed a white police officer (who had a
family, no less!), impose themselves on society’s consciousness and bolster the ideology.
The speech in this case declares: “black predators will kill law-abiding whites.” The
stronger ideology will be better equipped to find new images, and it will do so. This
cycle continues, with every revolution divorcing its adherent more and more from
objective reality. 164
¶56
The language of race and racial profiling is an attempt to define Black as Criminal
and White as Law Abiding, and thereby provide a window through which to view black
criminality and have that ideology reinforced. Physical and verbal abuse of blacks is
speech that declares white superiority over black criminality. Court rulings declaring that
officers’ motives do not matter as long as there is a pretext for the traffic stop is speech
that declares the officers to be powerful and morally right and black motorists to be at
best suspect, and at worst, criminal. The “perpetrator perspective” that claims to be
colorblind, in reality, “races” our society to whites’ advantage. 165 Blacks are targeted
more than whites for criminality, thus they are arrested and convicted more. 166 They fill
our jails more, but since the criminal justice system is declared to be colorblind, blacks
must be more prone to criminality than whites. The Bureau of Justice Statistics illustrates
this view well. On its cover, it declares America’s non-racism proudly: “9% of white
drivers were stopped . . . 9% of black drivers were stopped . . . 9% of Hispanic drivers
were stopped.” 167 Crack the spine, however, and find that blacks are statistically more
likely than whites to be searched, arrested, injured by police, have force used on them by
police, and be handcuffed. 168 Given only one of two options, either the existence of
unwarranted racial profiling or the biological propensity of blacks to criminal behavior,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics advertises the absence of the former and thereby chooses
the latter.
1. The Three Discourses
¶57

Lacan expands his discussion of language into three discourses which serve to
bring his ego creation schema into the realm of institutional and group relations and
159
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provide a framework into which we can readily insert the issue of racial profiling. The
discourses discussion posits that there are three types of language, distinguished by their
source and effectiveness in imposing their language on others. 169
¶58
The discourse of the master is the language of the dominant social group. 170 In our
case, the master is the government, law enforcement, prosecutors, and white, middle- and
upper-class society in general—the white dominant power structure. The master has the
power and connections to make his speech heard and believed: he has money to buy
airtime, congressmen to use the bully pulpit and effect legislation, and political and other
leverage to compel others to express his speech for him when necessary. It is the master
who conveys legal ideology, defines terms such as Criminal and Law Abiding Citizen,
splits people into “good” and “bad,” and creates the “truth” that becomes the actual truth
because most of society believes in the master’s speech. The master says that blacks are
Criminal and whites are Law Abiding.
¶59
The master speaks from the perpetrator perspective that believes in black hostility
rather than white racism. 171 This perspective insulates police from accountability172 by
judicial declarations of their respectability. 173 This perspective also condemns racial
profiling when it targets “good blacks”—black doctors, teachers, and other blacks “like
us.” In doing so, it “confirms if not entrenches our racial suspicions about crime and
criminality” 174 by highlighting only isolated incidents of “bad” cops profiling “good”
blacks. This is the language of splitting, which highlights what most think of as
exceptions to the rule that whites are good and blacks are bad. This language does
nothing to acknowledge that the split between races is purely illusory and constructed.
The purpose of the discourse of the master is that the master’s speech may be believed
and the master’s viewpoint and therefore existence be real. When bystanders view a
police officer making a traffic stop, they view justice investigating possible criminality.
Repeated a thousand times over with a black person in the drivers’ seat, bystanders come
to see not neutral policing for the public’s safety, but rather the power structure
investigating possible black criminality. The discourse of the master exists in the traffic
stop, and gradually, through racial profiling, its message—that blacks are Criminal—is
believed by all onlookers.
¶60
Interestingly, there is a point at which the master does not want his message to be
believed. At some point, black bystanders—and a few white ones—come to see through
the performance of justice against the black criminal. They cease to believe the master’s
claim that he is right, that he is the law. They begin to delegitimize the power structure,
and when the law loses its moral force, people are more likely to engage in crime. 175
Blacks who see racial profiling for what it is, therefore, are more likely to commit actual
crime, and become actual criminals, thus feeding the master’s discourse with fact. Less
and less, then, does the master have to rely on illusion and lies to split society.
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¶61

The discourse of university consists of the ideology posited by the master. 176 When
we speak of the Criminal and the Law Abiding Citizen, the university is the law. The
ideology of the law says that “a crime is a crime” and that “justice is blind.” This
ideology claims that discrimination no longer exists, that legal doctrine is neutral, and
that when a person, no matter the race, comes before the criminal court as a defendant,
that person is treated the same as any other, no matter the race. 177 The Bureau of Justice
Statistics report similarly holds out juicy statistics of disparate treatment, but refuses to
ask the questions that would show racial profiling. 178 Beyond rejecting the existence of
racial profiling, the Bostick Court accepted its use, 179 as did the Whren Court. 180 This
ideology is published by the master to great effect, for the racist in the picture cannot be
found. Even a detective as intrepid as Williams doubts her own finger pointing.
¶62
The hysteric points the finger as well. Her discourse is that of the disenfranchised
and disempowered. 181 Williams is the hysteric, and so she does not speak of the master’s
traditional legal doctrine. Instead, she speaks of homelessness, the bottom rung of the
hysteric’s world. 182 The hysteric might be the black senior law firm associate, told to
help the poor but “be cool.” 183 The hysteric is the poor black or even the middle class
white who sees racism swirling in the post-Katrina flood waters of New Orleans. The
hysteric opposes the master, and the hysteric, when heard (rarely), is discounted as
irrational. 184 His language is deemed invalid and, worse, imagined. The hysteric remains
in the mirror, and the master maintains his reality outside the glass.
¶63
When blacks complain of white racism and repression, they engage in the discourse
of the hysteric—despite the fact that the power structure’s own Kerner Report found the
very same thing. 185 The hysteric is the imagined Other in the mirror, and facts will not
bring her out into reality. When a 17-year-old black man filed a complaint with the
Illinois State Police, claiming that he was racially profiled, physically isolated,
interrogated about the (non-)presence of drugs, and called a “mother-fucking nigger” by a
police officer, 186 the state dismissed his voice as that of the hysteric. When he submitted
these allegations under a polygraph test and passed, the state determined that his
176
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complaint was unfounded. 187 The black man and his hysteric voice remained an illusion,
a nothingness. The maze of Supreme Court jurisprudence also does not give credence to
the hysteric voice. By portraying Bostick’s encounter with police as one in which race
was not a factor, the Bostick Court effectively denied that race was relevant in the search
and seizure of a black man by white law enforcement officers, 188 and the Whren Court
found that racial profiling had nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment. 189 Instead, a
complaint of racial profiling must be filed under the Equal Protection Clause, thus forcing
a nearly-impossible finding of discriminatory intent. 190
IV. FANON
¶64

Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks provides a vital link between Lacan’s
theories and black-white race relations. 191 Writing before Lacan’s theories were widely
published, Fanon adopts four of the same key ideas as Lacan. First, blacks establish their
selves through whites. Second, whites, as functionaries of the dominant power structure,
define and create blacks. They reject blacks by defining them as animals, savage,
murderers, and criminals. In so doing, whites create their selves as refined, intelligent,
superior, and law abiding. Third, whites do so through language, rejecting blacks to
establish themselves. Fourth, the black-white mirror relationship is based on illusion and
misunderstanding. 192
A. Black Self-Definition Through White’s Definition of Black

¶65

Fanon wrote about the relationship between the white European colonizer and the
black African native who has been colonized. His observations can, however, be applied
to contemporary American race relations, as Farley suggests in his discussion of the
modern-day American black ghetto as a neocolony 193 and as John Hayakawa Torok
suggests in his description of “anti-colonial, anti-subordination race consciousness.”194 In
this colony, the black person can establish his self—he can become real—only through
the limited definitions that the white colonist gives him. 195 The black can become real
only by being black as the white person imagines blacks to be. 196 This means a choice
between “acting white,” acting like a criminal, actually being a criminal, being a “sho’
good nigger,” 197 or asserting oneself. All choices are deadly. Acting white will only lead
to whites continuing to exclude the actor and blacks ostracizing the black actor as
187
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white. 198 Acting like a criminal is a mere minstrel act, unless one is a talented showman
such as 50 Cent or The Game, in which case one is a well-paid minstrel. Actually being a
criminal lands one in jail and only serves to perpetuate the Criminal image of blacks.
Being a “sho’ good nigger” is yet another minstrel act of the Sambo variety. Asserting
oneself is the deadliest choice, for then the black person becomes “militant” in white
eyes, a threat to be put down by any means necessary. 199 For Fanon, the black person
must accord with White definitions of Black. 200 If he does not, he may disappear. 201
When the definitions are all of inferiority, the black person is hemmed in and must play
the inferior or be nothing at all.
¶66
Upon his arrival in America, Devon Carbado worked through a couple of his
choices: “I was not eager, upon my arrival to the United States, to assert a black
American identity. . . . But I became a black American anyway. . . . [This identity] was
ascribed to me.” 202 For Carbado, being black in America is not a mode of true existence,
of being one’s true self. Rather, it is a “performance of blackness” consisting of being
obedient to police, not asserting one’s rights, not maintaining one’s dignity, and not
confronting authority. 203 Carbado, a law abiding, black law professor must play the role
of the inferior, the minstrel, or else be branded a criminal. Even playing this role, he
must work hard to prove his innocence, because to be anything other than criminal is to
depart from the script. 204 In departing from the script, others lose sight of the black man,
because they look for a criminal and do not find it. In departing from the script—in being
other than inferior and/or criminal—the black man disappears. 205
B. The Disappearance of Black
¶67

The disappearance of Black manifests itself in a few ways. Carbado disappears
when he does not play the role that white America has set for him. He disappears when
he attempts to be himself, to be free, to be undefined. Blacks disappear when they are
racially profiled. Through racial profiling, blacks are demoralized. 206 Their morals—
their values and therefore their selves—are literally taken from them, and the morals of
the criminal placed within them. Through racial profiling, blacks’ histories and past
achievements are taken from them and are replaced with stock histories that lead to the
stock criminal. One “well-dressed, 28-year-old [black] advertising account executive
with a media company” was racially profiled. 207 After years of playing the game and
198
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looking and acting the part, the system still will not let him in. He is black, so he’s
suspect, a man to be watched, a likely criminal. 208 Disappearance occurs when Black is
defined, even if it is defined as a positive. Mary Joe Frug 209 wrote that women will be
free only when they cease to be able to be defined. 210 So is the case with blacks: only
when they cannot be seen as criminal, minstrel, self-assertive, or any stereotype will they
be freed from racial profiling and their own disappearance through their definition at the
hands of the white power structure.
¶68
The white colonist creates many colorful definitions of inferiority for the black
native. 211 In so doing, the colonist rejects blacks and embraces his self as beautiful,
virtuous, intelligent, and rational. He must, furthermore, convince the black person to
accept his definitions, since he must be heard and believed for his construct to become
real. Carbado writes that police interaction with blacks is intended to “make black people
feel bad about, and uncomfortable with, being black.” 212 The depression, fear, and anger
that results in the victim of racial profiling comes about because he has been penetrated—
raped even—by a powerful, almost irresistible force that compels him to believe in his
own inferiority. Only one incidence of racial profiling may stigmatize the victim for the
rest of her life. 213 Repeated victimization will traumatize the black person and, at worst,
convince her that she is, in fact, inferior and criminal.214
¶69
White therefore needs Black recognition, but is unwilling to recognize Black in
return. 215 Fanon ventures past Lacan, however, in suggesting a reason that whites need to
define blacks as inferior: just as American whites created the “Bad Injun” stereotype,
they may also need to create the “Bad Black” image in order to lull their uneasy national
conscience in light of past mass crimes against humanity. 216 From slavery, through the
Black Codes, through Jim Crow, to today, “the legacy of slavery . . . still infects police
policies and practices toward Black people.” 217 To hide from their own criminality,
whites criminalize blacks. By doing so, they both justify their own anti-black crimes in
history and create themselves as law-abiding citizens.
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C. Language
¶70

Language is the medium in which White creates Black. Language, as Lacan says,
tells us more about the speaker than about the subject, 218 and Fanon provides a reason
why: speech is desire. 219 When the white man speaks of the criminal black man, he
desires to be himself a law-abiding citizen. When he speaks of blacks’ separateness, he
desires to be integrated into the dominant power structure. When he refers to blacks as a
“problem people,” 220 he wishes himself to be the solution and non-problem. Language
itself is a way to assume the dominant power structure and is a way into the structure. It
is why Fanon’s black natives return from France having “forgotten” how to speak pidgin
and having adopted “proper” French. 221 It is why “talking white” takes on such
suggestive importance in black America today. A word of warning, however: language
can get one access to the dominant power structure only if that structure is prepared to
admit the person in the first place.222 That is why “acting white” is a deadly choice for
blacks—the structure does not want to let them in, no matter how proper the English.
¶71
The stops, searches, and arrests of racial profiling are speech as well. It allows
blacks to assume their proper role as Criminal in the dominant power structure’s system.
We are to believe the power structure when it implies, through court rulings, statistical
analyses, and disparate treatment in the criminal justice system that blacks have a
biological propensity to crime.
¶72
Fanon, like Lacan, rests his observations on an uneasy bed of illusion and
misunderstanding. 223 Whites’ definitions of Black are misunderstandings at best, outright
lies intended to maintain white power at worst. And the worst has arrived: Fanon
observes that whites want the world. They must, therefore, reject all others as unworthy
of existence, of being real. 224 Whites therefore use their creative and persuasive power to
define blacks, and their physical and coercive power to force blacks to accord with these
meanings. 225 Whites therefore find suspicion in blacks wearing baggy clothes. 226 Whites
find suspicion in blacks driving nice cars. 227 Where blacks offer no suspicious activity,
whites will create it: half the cocaine seized by Dallas police in 2001 turned out to be
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powderized sheetrock, a substance the police use when they plant drugs on people. 228
When whites want the world for themselves and their definitions for blacks all lead to
certain death, the only choice is slow, seemingly voluntary, genocide. 229 Indeed, blacks
are a “protected class”—an endangered species that, like others, is dying out at the hands
of the dominant power structure. The introduction to rap artist Ice Cube’s song
“Endangered Species,” echoes this sentiment. 230 There is also a thread of self-fulfilling
prophesy in Fanon’s writing. White has defined Black as Criminal and has rejected him
as such. The black person may either attempt to become real through the white world by
becoming Criminal, or he may, expecting to be rejected as such, do all he can to realize
the rejection. Either way, the black person “chooses” to be Criminal. Where being
Criminal is one of only a few choices one has for expression, one will likely choose that,
however abased it is. 231 Where blacks are believed to be more involved in the drug trade
than they are, and they are racially profiled because of this belief, the prophesy will be
fulfilled and they will in fact enter the drug trade. 232
¶73
The result is as Barnard Harcourt would predict. He posits a cycle in which
ideology informs imagery, which, in turn, feeds ideology. The white ideology of blacks
as Criminal leads to images that reinforce that ideology, which, in turn, lead to a greater
availability of images. 233 This ideology engenders overenforcement of law in black
neighborhoods, 234 which puts more blacks in jail, even when they are innocent. 235 Racial
profiling through overenforcement, the relative ease with which blacks are convicted at
trial, 236 and the disparity between amounts of black and white prisoners provide ample
imagery to feed the ideology of black criminality. The upshot is a perception and actual
reality of more black criminals.
V. FARLEY
¶74

Where Fanon revealed black-white relations in Europe and Africa to support
Lacan’s theories, Anthony Farley shows that Fanon’s observations and Lacan’s theories
apply in contemporary America as well. In his article “The Black Body as Fetish
Object,” Farley examines American black-white relations through the lens of a sadist228
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masochist pursuit of white pleasure through black humiliation. 237 Farley invokes Fanon’s
and Lacan’s thinking in seeing that White “excrementalizes” Black in order that White
may feel blessed. 238 By “nobodying” blacks, furthermore, whites feel an “ecstasy of
belonging.” 239 Farley thus recalls Lacan’s belief that we reject others so that we may
become real. Whites create themselves as the opposite of how they create blacks.
¶75
First, Farley places race in the realm of sadist-masochist pursuit of pleasure, in
which whites play the role of sadist, of superior-to-black, in order to feel morally good
about their own race. Whites control blacks’ condition of subordination: the black
suffering under racial profiling and other racist mechanisms will be ameliorated and
blacks will get their constitutional rights only to the extent that white policy-makers find
it in their interests to ameliorate.240 Whites establish their superiority by the Lacanian
rejection of blacks. They do so primarily through humiliation, which most often takes the
form of anti-black violence or threatened violence. Racial profiling strongly correlates
with excessive use of force by police officers. 241 Racial profiling, indeed, is a focal point
in the white dominant power structure’s attempt to maintain and enhance its limited
definition of Black as Criminal and White as Law Abiding. Where Brown posits “law
enforcers [seeing themselves] in a community of savages, as outposts in the law in a
jungle,” 242 Farley sees a sadist-masochist relationship. If we define others through
speech, then white sadism is extreme speech designed to impute extreme criminality on
the black victim.
A. Speech
¶76

The speech of police sadism has many examples. Leonard Mitchell is a 500-pound
black man who was arrested. Because of his weight and the fact that he was handcuffed,
he had a difficult time fitting into the back seat of the police car. He was thus charged
with resisting arrest and was called a “nigger” by an officer. 243 A Latino man with his
two young children in his car was approached by an officer. Without provocation, the
officer maced and beat the man as his children looked on in fear. 244 A well-dressed MBA
student, on his way to a job interview in his late-model Ford Explorer, was stopped. The
officers asked mockingly about the car: “Hey, where did you get the money for
something like this?” They tore the car apart, damaging it, looking for drugs. Finding
nothing, the officers simply drove off, leaving the victim weeping “in his anger and
humiliation.” 245 This is sadism manifest. One’s weight, one’s familial status, one’s
appearance of propriety and property are all used in the sadist-masochist performance of
whiteness as the law, as an outpost of civilization, and blackness as obedience to police,
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non-assertion of rights, of losing one’s dignity. 246 But this sadist-masochist relationship
is not always non-violent.
B. Excrementalizing Black
¶77

When Farley speaks of White “excrementalizing” Black, he points to his theory
that the racial sadist-masochist relationship, like sex, is about the pleasure of the physical
body. When Carbado was racially profiled, the bystanders’ “eyes were all over our
bodies.” 247 When the ACLU’s Laura Murphy testified before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, she spoke of the stereotype of blacks as sexual beasts who would turn white
virgins into hyper-sexed prostitutes. 248 Race is primitive, feral, and physical. The
pleasure whites derive from anti-black sadism must, therefore, be sadism directed not
only at blacks’ psyche, but also their bodies themselves. Thus, there has been talk of
castrating (primarily black) rape convicts. Excrementalizing Black—turning his body
into the substance that was his body but is now the antithesis of his body, viz., body itself
rejected—is an attempt to destroy Black’s body from within. Abner Louima is a case in
point. In sodomizing Louima, the officers engaged in the height of sadism: they
humiliated him, they penetrated and raped him, they excrementalized him. His body, for
that time, was a body rejected. It had turned to waste. For that time, the police nobodied
Louima. Louima as a person, as a holder of constitutional rights, as a moral being, did
not exist. By nobodying Loiuma, the officers became real people, with rights, with
morals, with existence.
C. Why Race?

¶78

Why must race be the operand upon which whites create themselves? If, as Farley
argues, race itself is about feeling morally good, 249 then the white creation of the
wretched, abased, criminal black person is a necessary “process by which whites exorcise
their own demons, and is, therefore, a pleasure in itself. If the black body is the site and
cite of all ills, then the white body is not.” 250 White debasement of blacks leads to
pleasure, pleasure leads to ego enhancement, and ego enhancement leads to reality. This
debasement is especially required when whites have so many demons of historical
slavery to exorcise, 251 and when whites today use and possess more drugs and weapons
than blacks. 252 Farley has thus interpreted Lacan for twenty-first century America and
provided a reason for racism.
¶79
Farley also notes that White must create Black as naturally prone to crime since
only then will the hierarchy of white pleasure and black humiliation be justified. 253
Ironically, one way to accomplish this is to deny race itself: “[t]he colorline . . . is painful
to contemplate and so we often choose to dismiss the evidence of our eyes . . . . It hurts to
246
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look one’s oppression in the face.” 254 By denying the colorline, we deny discrimination
its reality; we thereby deny social context its power to create black crime and thus place
all responsibility on the individual. The Bureau of Justice Statistics therefore collects
data showing disparate treatment, but does not ask questions that would reveal racial
profiling. 255 It also advertises on its cover the one statistic that suggests a truly colorblind
society in which officers treat races equally. 256 Reading further, statistics showing
disparate treatment implicitly ask us to believe in blacks’ biological propensity to crime.
¶80
In addition to colorblinding society, the power structure hides the mechanisms of
power, and must do so, for when the mechanisms are revealed, the power is lost. The
Bustamonte Court alluded to this when it held that officers do not have to inform people
that they may refuse an officer’s request to search. 257 Since blacks are more likely not to
know or not assert their rights, this holding encourages disparate treatment of blacks in
racial profiling, and provides a judicial imprimatur on a method of policing dependant on
people’s ignorance of their rights. 258 When this happens, the power structure targets more
blacks than whites and thus apprehends more black criminals. With discrimination and
social context excluded from the courtroom, the defendant is convicted and anti-black
racist ideology grows stronger with its new image. Under the guise of colorblindness
(Bustamonte applies to everyone, does it not?), blacks continue to be disparately arrested,
but since the law treats everyone the same, society concludes that blacks are biologically
prone to crime.
¶81
This criminal stigmatization of blacks justifies their subordination as a group. 259
Sinking Black pushes White up to the status of law enforcing and Law Abiding. The
hierarchy is thus established. Overenforcement of laws in black communities is a
consequence, therefore, of increased black arrests and imagery that feeds the original
ideology of Black as Criminal.
¶82
Farley echoes Fanon in placing his observations in the neocolonialist structure, in
which the American black ghetto is the colony, white America the home country. Where
Fanon’s colony would produce textiles or foodstuffs, Farley’s ghetto colony exports its
criminality for white consumption. Whites purchase their purity by watching black
depravity in the form of crime statistics, violent hip-hop, broken homes, drugs, and
poverty. 260 Since America’s neocolonies around the world today are primarily economic
in nature, as opposed to geo-militaristic, it pays to look at the domestic anti-black
neocolonies in the same way.
D. The Economic Neocolony
¶83

There is a movement today that attempts to deprive black America of its economic
wealth and opportunity. If “time is money,” then whenever an officer racially profiles a
254
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black person—a stop which can often take over an hour—that officer deprives the victim
of his time and, therefore, money. One woman was profiled, arrested for parking tickets
that had already been paid, and missed work as a result. 261 One young man was on his
way to a job interview when he was profiled. He was left in tears, angry and
humiliated. 262 If he did not miss his interview, he certainly did not perform as well as he
might have.
¶84
Law enforcement steals more than blacks’ time. Law enforcement confiscates
goods. It confiscates black children’s bicycles and sells them. 263 It accuses a black
shopper of stealing items, detains her for three hours, and even when the items are proven
to be paid for, it still confiscates them. 264 In 1997, local police departments and sheriff’s
departments received $648 million worth of cash, goods, and property from drug asset
forfeiture programs. 265 Although it is unknown how much of this total was seized from
blacks, the system of civil and criminal asset forfeiture is set up to encourage racial
profiling. 266
¶85
Local civil forfeiture statutes normally require a large percentage of seized assets to
be used to fund, say, local education. 267 Aided by “federal adoption” of seized assets,
however, local law enforcement can turn the assets over to the federal government and
receive back up to eighty percent of their value. 268 Such a process has “minimal
constitutional protections,” 269 namely, that the burden of proof for recovery of assets is on
the person whose property has been seized. 270 This seizure regime “almost inevitably
lead[s] to a conflict between economic self-interest and traditional law enforcement
objectives. Such a conflict . . . promotes overzealous law enforcement practices such as
. . . racial profiling.” 271 The regime also made it so law enforcement officers’ best hauls
would come from seizing goods from people who lacked “the resources to win them
back.” 272 With minority status and poverty closed correlated, this means a further
incentive to racially profile blacks.
¶86
In addition to civil forfeiture schemes, federal and state programs increase local
agencies’ funding based on the number of drug-related arrests and convictions the local
agencies make. 273 Since minorities are less likely to hire defense attorneys and are “more
likely to be viewed as inherently suspect by judges and jurors,” they are easier to convict,
so police departments target these groups. 274 By engaging in this process of selfenrichment, law enforcement concomitantly inflicts mass deprivation on the black
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community by jailing large numbers of its youth. This process “is no accident. It is the
direct consequence of ‘rational law enforcement’ policies that target blacks.” 275
¶87
Is there another way out? Can blacks play a part other than the criminal? They
may play the minstrel, 276 but this is no choice at all, since both the criminal and the
minstrel are humiliated in order to ensure the race pleasure of the whites. There is no
way out through reason, because white pleasure and enjoyment through stereotyping
always prevail over facts and experience.
VI. FOUCAULT: TOWARD A “WHY” OF RACIAL PROFILING
A. What is Racial Profiling?
¶88

Earlier in this article, I noted that racial profiling occurs when law enforcement
officials—in the absence of a suspect-specific description—selectively consider race in
deciding when to investigate, arrest, and prosecute. 277 This, however, is perhaps merely
its surface manifestation. Lacan, Fanon, and Farley would undoubtedly dig deeper to
discover what racial profiling, in essence, is. While never mentioning racial profiling per
se, Michel Foucault would likely argue that racial profiling is an expression of power.
Power, writes Foucault, is that which represses a class or individuals. 278 The role of
political power “is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to re-inscribe that relationship of
force, and to re-inscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the
bodies of individuals.” 279 A Lacanian, Fanonian, and Farleyian notion of racial profiling
does just that: it sets the relations of power and instills inequalities through language and
upon the bodies of white and black subjects. Foucault’s silent war, furthermore, is one
which divides White and Black into two camps: “[t]he war that is going on beneath order
and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is,
basically, a race war.” 280 In fact, race lies at the heart of Foucault’s notion of political
power as war. 281
¶89
Racial profiling, therefore, is both an expression of power and a weapon in the
silent race war that Williams, the Detective, detects. This power cannot be proven by
traditional legal discourse and analysis, since power “has gradually been penetrated by
quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of
law.” 282 Law, for Foucault, has become “increasingly incapable of coding power, of
serving as its system of representation.” 283 Suggesting a new approach to analyzing
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power, Foucault argues for a mode of analysis that challenges the white male dominant
discourse of law. He writes:
It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoretical
privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the
concrete and historical framework of its operation. We must construct an
analysis of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code. 284
¶90

Although he does not clearly describe this new analysis of power, he points to an
analysis that I take on in this essay through Lacan, Fanon, and Farley. Foucault writes
that to understand power, we must “abandon the juridical notion of sovereignty . . . [and
instead] inquire how relations of subjectivization can manufacture subjects.” 285 In other
words, an inquiry into racial profiling must ask how the power structure creates Black as
Criminal and White as Law Abiding. Not only does power create subjects, 286 but it also
creates knowledge. 287 In the case of racial profiling, the knowledge that power creates—
however fantastic—is that blacks commit more crime than whites, that blacks are
biologically predisposed to criminality, and that blacks are therefore a legitimate target of
police surveillance. Power and knowledge finally come together to reinforce each other:
“[t]he exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge
constantly induces effects on power.” 288 By racially profiling, we create more subjects
against whom racial profiling is justifiable. We create the Lacanian Criminal in the black
person.
¶91
Racial profiling, therefore, for the purposes of this article, is an expression of the
power wielded by the white male dominant power structure and is a tool in the silent race
war being waged across America. This power is not a legal one (though, to be sure, legal
means are marshaled in its exercise) and cannot be discovered through such traditional
means. Foucault’s well-known maxim strikes a tone all too familiar to Williams: the
success of power “is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” 289 This
power, rather, is one that exists beyond that state apparatus. 290 It exists in all of us 291 and
so we ought to take a psychological approach to understanding this power and racial
profiling. With this approach, I conclude that racial profiling is, in a word, a tool in the
creation of subjects. Why, then, must we create subjects? In other words, why do we
racially profile?
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B. Why Do We Racially Profile?
¶92

Foucault repeatedly avoids the question of why people engage in power and why
power relations are as they are. He writes that asking why “leads us, I think, into a
labyrinth from which there is no way out.” 292 In this labyrinth, the “why” of power is an
“unanswerable question.” 293 The proper questions—the answerable questions that might
produce change—inquire into what power relations are at work, how these relations make
possible certain discourses—in the case of this article, the discourse of Black as Criminal
and White as Law Abiding Citizen—and, finally, how these discourses are used to
support the power relations. 294 Foucault inquires into the mechanisms, effects, and
relations of power, 295 and he answers these questions with a focus aligned with that of
this article. One commentator writes that: “Foucault’s concept of individualization
implies that individuals are entirely constructed and changeable: that there is a process at
work that first separates humans from one another, and then defines the parameters and
possibilities of each separated person. Foucault’s individuals are frequently both the
product and the victims of power.” 296
¶93
Foucault’s answer to the “how” of power is thus an answer posited by Lacan,
Fanon, and Farley: the dominant power structure shapes power relations through racial
profiling by constructing blacks as criminals and whites as law-abiding citizens. By so
doing, power creates a discourse that separates the races and defines the possibilities of
each race as those associated with criminals and law-abiding citizens. This article thus
answers the Foucaultian “how.” It goes beyond Foucault’s stated intentions, however, in
suggesting why people racially profile. We shall see, as well, that although he denies his
ability to do so, Foucault himself suggests some answers to this “why.”
¶94
Lacan would likely suggest that people racially profile out of a primitive and
immature need to establish their own egos through rejection of the Other. Indeed, this
creation of the other as less-than seems to be a common thread in the thoughts of Lacan,
Fanon, Farley, and Harcourt. Foucault concurs with this arguably fundamental
psychological need: he writes that “the law comes to be seen as a Janus-faced reality: the
triumph of some means the submission of others.” 297 He goes on, writing that “‘[i]n order
to live, you must destroy your enemies’ . . . [and] racism makes it possible to establish a
relationship between my life and the death of the other that is . . . a biological-type
relationship.” 298
¶95
Racism is, for Foucault, necessary to the State: only with racism can state killing be
justified, 299 and only with racism can the State exercise its sovereign power. 300 The aim
of this killing and power is nothing less than the purity of the race. Foucault writes that
“the actual roots of racism” are bound up in the State’s need “to use race, the elimination
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of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.” 301 He goes on,
writing that racism is used “to take control of life, to manage it, to compensate for its
aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents and possibilities.” 302 Racial
profiling, then, as a manifestation of racism, is used to effect racial purity, and within that
purity, achieve a kind of control and predictability over society. Power of its nature
expands until it surveys and controls everything. A heterogeneous racial society is
complex and unpredictable—a homogenous one is unified, therefore simple, and
therefore easy to survey and control. Racial profiling is therefore a tool used to achieve
control over society and life itself.
¶96
But why must the target be black Americans? Why not Asians, or Jews, or people
with red hair? For Foucault, power relations and associated repressions are born in
history and random historical events surrounding past wars and conflicts. Foucault writes
that:
[A]t the beginning of history and law one will posit a series of brute facts
(physical vigor, force, character traits), a series of chance happenings
(defeats, victories, successes or failures of conspiracy, rebellions or
alliances). And only above this tangle will a growing rationality take
shape, that of calculations and strategies—a rationality that, as one rises
and it develops, becomes increasingly fragile, more and more spiteful,
more closely tied to illusion, to fancy, to mystification. So we have the
complete opposite of those traditional analyses which attempt to
rediscover, beneath the visible brutality of bodies and passions, a
fundamental, abiding rationality, linked by nature to the just and the good
. . . . [The search for the source of power relations seeks] to awaken,
beneath the form of institutions or laws, the forgotten past of real
struggles, of masked victories or defeats, the dried blood in the codes. 303
¶97

Foucault, therefore, would locate the source of racial profiling in the history of
black-white relations in America. From the slave trade, plantation life, the Civil War,
and subsequent fights for and against racial equality up to the present day, Foucault’s
“brute facts” and “series of chance happenings” have morphed into the “calculations and
strategies” of today that seek to insinuate that blacks are naturally criminals and whites
law abiding. Foucault echoes Lacan at this point, noting that such calculations are fragile
and based on illusion and fantasy. Foucault also suggests Farley’s notion of the body
fetish, implying a fantastic fascination with the black body as virile, exotic, dangerous,
and Criminal. In fact, writes Foucault, the very notion of the “social body is . . . the
materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals.” 304 “[N]othing,” writes
Foucault, “is more material, physical, corporal than the exercise of power.” 305
¶98
If we can suggest why people racially profile, what can be said of the importance of
this knowledge?
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1. Why is it Important to Understand Why People Racially Profile? Why Will
Understanding Why People Racially Profile Help Alleviate the Problem?
¶99

By understanding why people racially profile—or, from a Foucaultian viewpoint,
by understanding at least what the mechanisms, effects, and relations of power are—we
reveal the mechanics of power. By revealing the racist mechanics of the power that is
racial profiling, this racist power is defeated, since the success of power “is proportional
to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” 306 By discussing racial profiling, we speak of
racism, and by speaking of racism, we upset the established racist state of affairs and
anticipate freedom from this state.307 By speaking of racism, we fight the silent race
war. 308 By speaking, we remove obstacles and break secrets in order to escape the grasp
of repressive power. 309
¶100
By speaking of racial profiling, however, we do not only reveal and thereby defeat
the racist power structure. By speaking, we also produce a new truth 310 to replace the
current racist truth. Foucault calls for “the revelation of truth, the overturning of global
laws, the proclamation of a new day to come, and the promise of a certain felicity.” 311 By
refuting the power structure that perpetuates racial profiling and replacing it with one that
reveals racial profiling to be based not on fact and empirical data, but on illusion and
misunderstanding, this article hopes to reveal the truth and thereby overturn the current
racist legal structure.
¶101
This article aims at the type of revolution Foucault envisions, but it also aims at
simple justice and fairness. In a system in which one segment of the population is
targeted for no other reason than the color of its members’ skin, that segment is
demoralized and tends to disappear. It is condemned before it has deserved
condemnation. As a result, the entire population, black as well as white, is hurt. It is hurt
because racial profiling lessens the legitimacy of the justice system as well as reduces the
efficiency and effectiveness of policing. Racial profiling possibly even serves to create
criminals and thus increase the level of criminality in society. We all, therefore, have a
stake in fighting racial profiling.
¶102
At the very least, this article can teach those of us who would not support racially
motivated policing but for misguided beliefs that it is effective and that blacks do actually
commit more crime. Foucault writes that “there is not an injustice in the world to which
we are not accomplices.” 312 He goes on to say that “[individuals] are not only [power’s]
inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation . . . . The
individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.” 313 In short, “we
all have a fascism in our heads . . . we all have a power in our bodies.” 314 By
understanding the “them” who we see as racist purveyors of racial profiling, we may
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begin to see our own acts which, although we do not initially recognize as racist, become
apparent as contributors to the racist power structure.
VII.

SOLUTIONS: TRUTH-SPREADING AND TERRY

¶103

There is in this article a disturbing suggestion that because the power source of
racial profiling is fortressed in people’s subconscious and unconscious it is at best a
nearly impossible demon to slay. Derrick Bell, in his book Silent Covenants, suggests the
same. 315 Implicit in this article is also, however, a faith in language and communication
to lead us to a better society. If enough people speak out against racial profiling and if
enough people believe these voices, Lacan’s, Fanon’s, and Farley’s theories all hold that
society will gradually change into one that speaks out, collectively, against racial
profiling and by doing so, will cease to racially profile. Like Hamlet, we too may take up
the arms of language against a sea of racial profiling, and by opposing, end it. 316 This is,
in fact, exactly what is happening.
¶104
Countless commentators have in recent years joined the fight against racial
profiling, and in doing so have offered solutions and raised others’ consciousness about
the problem. As a result, racial profiling as this article defines it is largely condemned,
even in law enforcement circles. Society is hearing and believing the voice against racial
profiling. The solution to the problem lies, perhaps, not in the adoption of any one
solution, but in the very process of offering such solutions.
¶105
Commentators have offered solutions that lie in one of two camps. Some are what
I call “truth-spreading” solutions, and others are “legal-judicial” in nature. Truthspreading solutions are based on data collection, analysis of the data, and use of the data
to manage and train police officers with a view to a shift in culture away from racial
profiling. 317 Such solutions depend on the cooperation of police departments and officers
to collect data, 318 supervise themselves, problem-solve based on the data findings, 319 and
engage in critical self-evaluation in light of accusations of racial profiling. 320 Truthspreading then requires police to work cooperatively with communities of color in order
to further raise officers’ awareness of their own biases and eventually change their
behavior. 321 Truth-spreading depends on police departments making their own policies,
315
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self-regulating, 322 and addressing police misconduct internally. 323 This suggests the
principle upon which truth-spreading is based: that police are not racist and that they
police in the most progressive, non-race-based ways that the data shows to be effective.
¶106
Legal-judicial solutions, in contrast, have as their founding principle the theory that
police will abuse their power and use impermissible considerations of race to the extent
the law allows. Legal-judicial solutions thus suggest changes to the law, to the way
judges consider cases in which race is involved, and to the way attorneys argue such
cases that will serve to limit the power and authority of police officers. These solutions
include those such as adopting a per se rule against racially motivated searches and
seizures; 324 sanctioning police departments with loss of funds when they engage in
racially disproportionate traffic stops; 325 recognizing that state courts can, and do, rule
that Whren-type stops violate state constitutions; 326 requiring officers to inform stopped
motorists of their right to refuse consent to search and their right to drive away 327 ; and a
number of others. Such legal-judicial solutions are problematic because their founding
principle is that police use race impermissibly and will continue to do so by finding ways
around any new rule promulgated to prevent that use. 328 Their bedrock principle thereby
indicates their impotence to address the problem. This is not, however, to say that truthspreading is a panacea. Its psychological and philosophical underpinnings lack a
comfortable empiricism that we like to feel in our solutions, and its faith in the power
structure to reform itself goes against the theories of dominant power discussed in this
article. The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that we must continue to speak out against
racial profiling and offer any solution we can formulate, be it truth-spreading, legaljudicial, or a mixture of the two.
¶107
Truth-spreading is the main solution to racial profiling. It assumes that as racist
power is revealed in all its truth, that racist power will be weakened and a more truthbased, less racist power structure will arise in its place. Leaving that solution aside,
however, are there any legal-judicial avenues to explore? There are, certainly, as many
such avenues as one’s imagination can envision, most if not all of which will betray
Foucault, since, as he writes, “[o]ur task is to conquer power, not bring about justice.
Justice simply reconstitutes power.” 329 Since this article begins with Terry v. Ohio,
however, it seems only fair to give that opinion its due chance to serve in the silent war
against racial profiling.
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Terry presented the Court with a situation in which an officer observed three men,
whose activities comprised “suspicious circumstances.” 330 The officer feared that one or
more of the men may have had a gun. 331 Stirred to action by his suspicions, the officer
accosted the men, patted one of them down, and found a gun. 332 He then proceeded to
search all three men. 333
The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the guns, holding that the
officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of the defendants “purely for his own
protection.” 334 The trial court went on to distinguish between an investigatory “stop” and
an arrest, as well as between a “frisk” of the outer clothing of a suspect and a full-blown
search for evidence of a crime. 335 The trial court suggested that even if the officer feels
he must search a suspect for his own protection, he might be limited to a frisk and be
prohibited from engaging in a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s holding, and the Supreme Court
dismissed defendants’ appeal, stating that there was no constitutional question
involved. 336
The State court’s holding was thus one that limited officers’ prerogative to act to
only those circumstances in which they feel threatened. Whether an officer could engage
in a full-blown search under such circumstances was doubtful, but ultimately unclear.
The Supreme Court would expand the officer’s prerogative, but would place search
jurisprudence at a reasonable point.
The Supreme Court first noted the traditional requirements for a search: the officer
needs to have “specific and articulable facts” that reasonably warrant the intrusion 337 and
in taking action, the officer’s “good faith” belief in the necessity of the intrusion is not
enough. 338 The Court then, however, wrote that its concern was the ability of the officer
to protect himself from immediately dangerous criminals. 339 The Court thus held that if
an officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous person,
the officer can perform a search only for weapons that might be used against himself or
others nearby. 340 Probable cause is not required, 341 but reasonable suspicion is. 342
Commentators have derided Terry because it allowed officers to base traffic stops
and other officer-citizen searches on reasonable suspicion, thereby erasing the long-held
requirement of probable cause. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Terry, wrote in no
uncertain terms that the Terry majority’s decision took us all “a long step down the
totalitarian path.” 343 Subsequent Fourth Amendment cases have interpreted Terry to
require only reasonable suspicion in all traffic stop searches. I believe, however, that in
330
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this way Terry has been abused. Instead of killing off probable cause wholesale, I
believe that the Terry Court carved out a narrow exception that would allow searches
based on reasonable suspicion only when the officer believes, based on specific and
articulable facts, that either she or those nearby are in immediate physical danger from
the suspect the officer is observing. Such physical danger and the tools used to effect
physical harm—“guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the
police officer” 344 —were the majority’s focus, and they thus limited their holding to such
circumstances.
My solution to racial profiling rests on this reading of Terry and the necessary
following theory, that subsequent cases such as Whren abused Terry by paying homage to
it while expanding the acceptance of reasonable suspicion for searches far beyond
situations in which immediate physical danger is perceived. We ought, in my opinion, to
return to Terry and restore Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence in light of that
decision. Thus, probable cause would be needed for all searches in which an officer does
not perceive danger. The officer would still be able to protect herself and others if she
perceived immediate physical danger by engaging in a search based on reasonable
suspicion.
This radical regime would help to reduce racial profiling because most of racial
profiling relies on pretext stops intended to uncover narcotics. Pretext stops would no
longer be allowed, and if an officer did search someone based on something less than
probable cause and found an amount of narcotics, the narcotics would not be admissible
in evidence.
I might go even further than an exclusionary rule and argue that if an officer
searches someone based on a standard less than probable cause, that officer can arrest the
suspect only if the officer finds an illegal weapon that can be used immediately against
others in the suspect’s possession. If the officer finds narcotics, the officer would not be
able to arrest the suspect, but could merely confiscate the contraband.
A couple of examples might help.
An officer stops a motorist because she believes that the motorist is carrying
narcotics. She stops the motorist on the pretext of his broken taillight. She searches the
motorist’s car with his consent, and she indeed finds three kilograms of cocaine, but no
illegal weapons. The motorist does not represent an immediate physical danger to
anyone, and so the officer could merely confiscate the cocaine and send the motorist on
his way.
A beat cop sees a young woman walking along a street, seemingly attempting to
remain in the shadows and clutching something in her pocket. The officer sees a number
of yards ahead of the suspect a couple whom the woman seems to be following furtively.
The cop believes the woman has a gun and intends to accost the couple for some reason.
The cop thus has a reasonable suspicion that the woman is an immediate danger to the
couple. The cop can thus stop and search the woman. If he finds a gun, he can arrest the
woman. If in this search he also finds an amount of illegal narcotics, the prosecution
would also be able to introduce this in evidence on a drug charge.
In short, if the officer has probable cause, she can search and make an arrest based
on anything illegal she finds. If she has only reasonable suspicion, Terry applies and she
can search the suspect only if she has reasonable suspicion that the suspect represents an
344
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immediate physical danger to others. If she finds an illegal weapon that constitutes such
an immediate threat, she can arrest the suspect and the gun can come in as evidence. If
she finds no illegal gun but some other contraband, she can confiscate the contraband but
not make an arrest. If she finds an illegal weapon and other contraband, she can make an
arrest for all items and all items are admissible in evidence. If the officer has something
less than reasonable suspicion, then no search is allowed.
¶121
This solution may reduce racial profiling by disallowing pretext stops as well as
stops used to find drugs but that rely on something less than probable cause. This
solution also may reduce the violence associated with the drug trade by providing an
incentive for drug dealers to leave their weapons at home. The nexus between drugs and
guns would thus be weakened, along with the nexus between drug and gang violence.
This solution may also reduce the incidence of illegal gun possession by highlighting the
problem through the gun-specific lower standard of reasonable suspicion.
¶122
There are, obviously, problems with this solution. Police organizations and
prosecutors will be against it, and justifiably so, for why, when we have a drug dealer in
hand, would we want to let him go? Politicians, in turn, will not find much public
support for a regime that lets criminals off before they have even been arrested. I believe,
however, that this solution will not only address racial profiling and make sense in terms
of social policy, but, more importantly, I believe that this is the constitutionally correct
path to take.
VIII.
¶123

¶124

¶125

¶126
¶127

CONCLUSION

What here has been proven? Like Williams, I could be making all this up. The
statistics, the testimonies, the Supreme Court rulings, and state and federal policies may
all be just the random result of an honest attempt to make good law and reduce crime. If
a couple of racist cops emerge every now and then, it is unfortunate but, overall, not a
systemic problem and therefore not to be addressed. Perhaps they are right: racism is a
thing of America’s past, and I see it only because I want to see it.
Then again, there are the statistics, the testimonies, and the government actions.
They cannot be random. There must be some underlying paradigm, some belief
structure, some common goal toward which people who have power push. What could it
be?
Like Patricia Williams, I too will play the detective. Like her, I also cannot
produce a document, signed by the white male dominant power structure declaring
boldly, “We are Law Abiding Citizens, Blacks are Criminals, and We Shall Reify This
Racist Doctrine in Every Facet of Our Law Enforcement Institutions!” I must corner the
racist with circumstantial evidence, penning him in until he is defined, and Black loses
his burdensome definition of Criminal. What, then, is my evidence?
Blacks are disparately treated in all areas of the criminal justice system. This is
most salient in the realm of racial profiling. The government’s own statisticians tell me
this.
Court rulings have acknowledged the existence of racial profiling but have refused
to take steps to eradicate it. Courts have declared that police officers’ racist intentions in
profiling blacks are irrelevant to the legal analysis.
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The stories of those who have been racially profiled demonstrate the variegated
trauma that racial profiling inflicts on and within the victim. Along with the statistics, the
necessary conclusion is that this trauma is visited more on blacks than on whites.
Racial profiling has been approved by state and federal law enforcement agencies
as an effective law enforcement tool.
So much is clear. But, taken separately or together, none of the above four pieces
of evidence prove that racial profiling or racism itself exists. Here a leap of faith is
required, but it is a leap that has been taken by twenty-five percent of LAPD Officers, an
Oakland Police Department Captain, Justice Douglas, Judge Fortunato, Northeastern
University, the ACLU, Amnesty International, countless legal scholars, and many others.
When you leap, you leap into acceptance that institutionalized racism exists and labels
Black as Criminal and White as Law Abiding. This same institution creates its laws, its
jurisprudence, and its policies based on that one fallacious assumption, and thus creates
two separate justice systems: one for whites, in which they get their constitutional rights
with courtesy and respect, and one for blacks, who are lucky to be thrown a constitutional
bone, and when done so, are done so at the feet of hostile and suspicious white masters.
Why must this be?
The theories of Lacan, Fanon, and Farley suggest much as to “why.” The white
male dominant power structure—the government, the courts, law enforcement, and their
associates—wills itself to reality, wills the establishment of itself through the rejection of
the black Other. The power structure is in a mirror relation with the Other, and so creates
the Other as Criminal so that it may become Law Abiding. This Lacanian psychology is
played out on the Fanonian field of colony, in which Black is forever inferior and must
find definition only through White. Black is never, however, good enough, and White
never quite bad enough for the races to overlap. Farley relocates us into contemporary
America and finds White definition of self in the sadist-masochist relation it has with
Black. The humiliation, threat, and violence that racial profiling poses to the black
victim creates the white as morally good, good because of his skin color. Black remains
excrementalized, a nobody, a black hole containing nothing at one point (the minstrel)
and every sort of danger at another (the criminal).
White thus defines Black, and by defining controls him. White manages Black’s
existence, and does so for one purpose: White’s own will to power through his will to
reality.
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